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Security has long been a popular application of formal methods. This is be-
cause it is a fertile source of challenging problems that are important enough to 
justify the effort involved in developing mathematical models and formal tech-
niques. And their importance is growing. \Ve a.re moving to a more networked 
world where our vital transactions depend upon our ability to communicate 
securely over an untrusted netvvork and upon information and software ob-
tained from parties about >vhom we may knmv little if anything. To meet 
these challenges, .ivIFPS is bringing people in formal methods and semantics 
together with researchers in the field of security. A special session of :vIFPS15 
\Vas devoted to security. It involved one invited talk by .iviartin Abadi, and 
six speakers, Dominique Bolignano. Carl Gunter, Pat Lincoln. George Necula, 
Geoffrey Smith, and Paul Syverson. The speakers covered four major areas of 
security. In this introduction, we give an overview of these areas and indicate 
why they are important and what makes them difficult. \Ve also give a brief 
outline of the speakers' talks. 
2 Cryptographic Protocol Verification 
In order to communicate securely over an insecure network, it is necessary to 
use encryption to provide secrecy and to authenticate messages, and to develop 
protocols that use cryptography to perform such functions as the distribution 
of keys and the authentication of principals and transactions. But the use of 
cryptography does not in itself guarantee correctness; in many cases it may 
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he possible for a hostile intruder who has the ability to read, redirect, and 
alter messages to manipulate the protocol into revealing secret information or 
allmving the intruder to impersonate an honest principal, 'Without breaking 
the underlying crypto-algorithms. This concern is not merely a theoretical 
one: numerous examples exist of protocols that \Vere at one time believed to 
be secure but vvere found out to have serious security flaws some time after 
they \Vere published 1 . In their talks, I3olignano, Syverson and Lincoln each 
addressed different aspects of this problem. 
I3olignano described work related to his analysis of electronic commerce 
protocols. Such protocols arc typically very complicated, and the security 
properties proved typically involve proving the integrity of complex data struc-
tures. Thus it is necessary to find safe abstrnct'ions, that is abstractions that 
reduce the complexity of the system to be analyzed without jeopardizing the 
correctness of the conclusions reached. Bolignano outlined his techniques for 
finding such safe abstractions for cryptographic protocols. 
Syverson addressed the problem of reconciling belief logics developed for 
the analysis of cryptographic protocols, \Vhich require a relatively small amount 
of computational effort but tend to be overly abstract, \Vith state-based mod-
els, which arc more detailed (and hence usually more accurate), hut whose use 
in analysis tends to be more computationally intensive. He used the recently 
introduced strand space model [2], that tics together much of the recent work 
in state-based cryptographic protocol analysis, to provide a semantics for the 
modal authentication logic SVO [6]. 
Lincoln described a framework for analyzing security protocols in which 
protocol adversaries may be arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time processes. 
In this framework, protocols are vaitten in a restricted form of a the 11-calculus 
[5], a formal specification language developed for reasoning about communi-
cation in distributed systems, and secrecy is formulated in terms of observa-
tional cquiva.lencc 'Which involves quantifying over the possible environments 
that can interact with a protocol. This allows a more accurate model of the 
role cryptography plays in a cryptographic protocol while still retaining the 
benefits provided by a formal specification language. He also mentioned some 
more recent results in the complexity of analyzing secrecy in simple crypto-
graphic protocols. The problem of determining whether a protocol allmvs an 
intruder to gain access to a given secret is undecidable even for protocols 'With 
very strong restrictions on various parameters like message length and nesting 
depth of encryption. 
3 Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key cryptography provides a pmverful authentication mechanism. A 
principal can sign a message \vith a private key that only it knmvs, and any-
1 Sec [1] for a fc,v examples. 
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one can vcri(y it with the corresponding public key. But this alone is not very 
useful unless there is a way of associating public keys with principals. The ear-
liest work on public key cryptography suggested that public keys be published 
in a central place, such as a telephone directory. However, ·with the grmv-
ing widespread use of public keys, this is no longer practical. The common 
use novv is to have a public key authority that signs (and thus vouches for) 
a. certificate containing the principal's name and the public key belonging to 
it. The public key of this authority may be signed by a higher authority, and 
so forth, so that a. public key hierarchy is obtained. The issue is complicated 
by the fa.ct that many different hierarchies may exist, that circular chains of 
authentication may be allowed (e.g. the PCP "web of trust''), that certificates 
may be used not only to provide authentication of keys but to specify different 
privileges belonging to principals, and that both keys and privileges may be 
revoked by an authority. It is necessary to develop a. sound and expressive 
logic to reason about policies in this framevwrk and describe them ·without 
ambiguity. In his talk, Gunter shmvcd how type theory can be applied to 
the problem of certificate revocation and addressed the issues raised by the 
non-rnonoticity that such revocation introduces. 
4 Secrecy Models 
The ability not to reveal sensitive information is a key feature of security. 
Hmvever, it usually is not practical to verify that every piece of code that 
has access to secret information is trusted not to reveal it. Instead, it is 
quite common to have some smaller pa.rt of a system enforce a security pol-
icy describing the types of communication a. process \Vith access to sensitive 
information may have \Vith other parts of the system. However, \vhen the 
stakes arc high, a. simple access control policy may not be enough. A Trojan 
Horse in the untrusted process could use any visible effect the process has on 
the system as a covert channel in \vhich the sensitive information could be 
encoded. Visible effects could include resources used by the process, delays in 
processing for other parts of the system (timing channels) and even changes in 
the probability that other events vwuld or \vould not occur. The problem \Vas 
first noted by Lampson in 1973 [4L and has motivated much of the research 
in multilevel security, \Vhich deals with the problem of maintaining separation 
between data classified at different security levels in the same system. This 
problem has remained ·with us even as we move from timesharing operating 
systems to more networked architectures [3]. In his talk, Smith described a 
model for secrecy that takes into account, not only a process's ability to pro-
duce events that may be seen by another process, but a process's ability to 
affect the probability of certain events. 
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5 Code Verification 
Correctness of code has ahvays been an important problem. But code verifica-
tion, although it got off to a promising start has in recent years been regarded 
as too difficult to be practical, and efforts instead have concentrated on ver-
ification of higher-level system specifications. But increasing use of mobile 
code, that is, code 'vhich is sent over the network and executed, has sparked 
new interest in developing the best possible methods of assuring the safety of 
the code itself: by the user as \vell as the developer, and doing so in an au-
tomated way. Necula described the concept of proof-carrying code, in which 
mobile code carries its own proofs of safety vvith it, vvhich can be mechanically 
verified by the target execution environment. 
6 Conclusion 
Tools and techniques developed as part of the foundations of programming 
languages and their logics can be applied fruitfully to some aspects of security. 
The speakers in the Security Session provided yet more evidence of the growing 
synergy between the semantics of programming languages and security. For 
the details of their work, 'loVC invite you to read the papers that appear in these 
proceedings. 
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